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Abstract 
 
It is well recognised that adoption of information communication and technology (ICT) in 
healthcare can transform healthcare services.   Numerous countries are seeking to establish 
national e-health development and implementation.  To collect, store and process individual 
health information in an electronic system, healthcare providers need to comply with the 
appropriate security and privacy legislation.  Deploying ICT systems in healthcare operations 
can provide advantages in healthcare delivery; however, risks to privacy in such e-health 
systems must be addressed.   Adopting appropriate security technologies can simplify some 
of the complexity associated with privacy concerns.    
 
Evaluation criteria can be useful in providing a benchmark for users to assess the degree of 
confidence they can place in health information systems for the storage and processing of 
sensitive health information.  This paper provides an overview of the “Common Criteria (CC)” 
for the assessment of IT products and systems and relates privacy requirements to the 
relevant CC Protection Profiles.   We recommend a certain level of security in healthcare 
related information systems.  Healthcare providers need to deploy strong security platforms 
to ensure the protection of electronic health information from both internal and external 
threats including the provision of conformance in health information systems to regulatory 
and legal requirements.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 E-Health and Privacy  
“… the problem of privacy in the end is nothing more and nothing less than the root problem of the relation 
of each one of us to our fellow men.  
What belongs to the citizen alone? 
What belongs to society? 
…  timeless questions on the nature and place and destiny of man. ”
1
 
 
In the 21st century information, computer and telecommunications technology and its 
artefacts (ICT) provide the critical infrastructure needed to support many essential services 
including requirements of the healthcare sector.  The use of computer-based information 
systems and associated telecommunications infrastructure to process, transmit and store 
health information plays an increasingly significant role in the improvement of quality and 
productivity in healthcare.  There is evidence [1] to demonstrate that the use of ICT in 
healthcare can reduce errors, improve patient safety and increase the quality of that 
healthcare service.  Health records have clear requirements for managed confidentiality to 
safeguard personal privacy. 
                                            
1
 Thomas J Watson, Jr; “Technology and Privacy”, an address to the Commonwealth Club of California, April 15, 1968. 
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Privacy and confidentiality issues have plagued previous attempts at electronic health 
management systems.  This paper advocates a fresh approach based on an IT architecture 
which is inherently more controllably secure than previous systems.  The system proposed 
in this paper is based on a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model. 
 
E-health systems include a broad range of ICT applications that deliver healthcare services 
such as hospital management and information systems, electronic patient records, 
knowledge-based and expert systems, clinical decision making support systems, 
telemedicine, surgical simulations, computer-based assisted surgery and physician 
education.  Electronic health records (EHR) are a fundamental building block of all e-health 
applications.  Numerous countries, such as Australia, the UK, New Zealand and Canada, are 
all active in e-health initiatives.  They are seeking to establish national e-health initiatives 
through requirements for the implementation of electronic health record systems coupled 
with the protection of privacy and confidentiality of such electronic health records.   
 
In order to collect, store and process individual health information in an electronic system, 
healthcare providers, both public and private, need to comply with the appropriate security 
and privacy legislation and associated regulations.  Thus, an understanding of both national 
and international legal requirements regarding the maintenance of electronic health records 
is necessary for the establishment of any framework for security management in health 
information systems (HIS).  In the US, the “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA)” of 1996 has implications for major widespread reforms in the US healthcare 
sector.  In the case of Australia, this means compliance with the Federal Privacy Act and 
jurisdictional State or Territory privacy and health record laws.  It must be noted however 
that not all individuals have trust and confidence in the overall management of their health 
records or in the associated information systems used by healthcare providers.  To instil an 
individual’s trust and confidence, it is critical to ensure that sensitive electronic health 
information is maintained appropriately and that any such security measures are understood 
and accepted by an individual and by society at large.   
 
To develop a reliable and secure HIS, we must ensure that appropriate levels of information 
security services and mechanisms are built into the HIS.  This protects associated electronic 
health records against misuse, disclosure and unauthorised access, as well as providing 
guarantees of availability.  Independent IT evaluation schemes can be beneficial in 
assessing the strength of security implementations in an HIS.  Evaluation criteria can be 
useful in providing a benchmark for users to assess the degree of confidence that they can 
place in the HIS for the storage and processing of sensitive health information.  Moreover, 
they provide a basis for specifying security requirements in the design, specification and 
purchase of an HIS.  In turn, such IT evaluation criteria can provide guidance to system 
developers as to the type and level of security features required in their systems or products.  
 
The proposed MAC-based system primarily satisfies the requirement for confidentiality of 
records.  The healthcare management system application is then developed on this secured 
foundation.  This approach is in stark contrast to current and previous healthcare 
management systems, which are based upon a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model 
whose primary function is not confidentiality of information records.  Information and 
communication technologies are sufficiently advanced that a MAC-based electronic 
healthcare management system is now quite feasible. 
 
1.2 Paper Structure 
This paper identifies and discusses issues relevant to the application of our proposed 
system and its healthcare management application.  In conclusion, the paper describes a 
way forward for the development of the MAC-based healthcare management system. 
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Section 2 of this paper includes discussions of current e-health attempts and initiatives in the 
UK and Australia.  It also addresses e-health concerns and considerations.  Deploying ICT 
systems in healthcare operations can prove advantageous in healthcare delivery; however, 
risks to privacy in such e-health systems must be addressed.  
 
Section 3 reviews the USA and Australian laws in regard to the protection of health 
information.  The USA’s HIPAA provisions may have widespread implications on the entire 
healthcare industry worldwide in addition to having an immediate affect on every information 
system that uses or processes health information in the USA.   
 
Section 4 provides an overview of the “Common Criteria (CC)”, now international standard 
IS-15408, for the assessment of IT products and systems and relates privacy to relevant CC 
Protection Profiles.   
 
Section 5 explains the basic concept of cryptography including exemplary applications using 
cryptographic techniques in e-health initiatives to ensure the security of electronic health 
records.  Finally, some implications and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Current and previous e-Health Management Systems 
 
2.1 E-Health Initiatives  
 
In developing a new approach to the e-health management application, one needs to be 
aware of issues identified with current and previous attempts. 
 
The current UK National Programme for IT (NPfIT) was initiated in 2002 as a ten-year 
project for providing electronic health record maintenance for 50 million patients2.  Its goal is 
to connect 8,000 surgeries, 240 hospitals, 100,000 doctors and 380,000 by providing 
management of electronic health records, electronic booking of medical appointments and 
electronic prescribing.  One of the program’s criticisms is the perception of a lack of 
adequate security measures in place to protect the confidentiality of electronic patient 
records.   
 
In Australia individual states and territories have their own individual programs.  The current 
national e-health strategy is “HealthConnect”3which aims to implement a consistent national 
electronic health information system. Many aspects of HealthConnect have been criticised 
as well as the workability of the concept itself456. 
 
 
2.2. E-health Concerns and Considerations 
 
ICT plays an increasingly significant role in the improvement of quality and productivity in 
healthcare.  It is well recognised that adoption of ICT in healthcare is a critical enabler to 
transform healthcare services.  Notwithstanding the obvious potential advantages of 
                                            
2
 Brogan, B. “Inquiry as NHS patient records go online” from Telegraph Newspaper Online is available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/08/31/nhs31.xml, accessed 14/08/2006. 
3 
“What is happening – National” is available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/publishing.nsf/Content/national-1lp, 
accessed 09/07/2006. 
4 
More D., “HealthConnect - A Major Rethink Required?” is available at 
http://www.newmatilda.com/policytoolkit/policydetail.asp?PolicyID=106, accessed 16/07/2006. 
5 
Howarth, B., “Australia's e-records mess” is available at http://www.govhealthit.com/article94797-06-12-06-Print accessed 
15/07/2006. 
6 
Braue, D., “E-health gaining traction: Conference delegates”, is available at 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/software/soa/E_health_gaining_traction_Conference_delegates/0,2000061733,39205201,00.
htm, accessed 17/08/2006. 
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deploying ICT in healthcare services, there are some concerns associated with integration 
and access to electronic health records.  Information stored within electronic health systems 
is highly sensitive by its nature.   
 
There is growing evidence worldwide that healthcare information systems are being rapidly 
connected to the Internet since most health information systems are designed and 
developed to be accessible through networked and distributed computing environments.  
Open usage of the global Internet’s services, however, must be considered to be inherently 
insecure.  This accentuates the public’s concern for privacy.  
 
A security violation in an HIS can cause catastrophic damage for healthcare providers and 
consumers in the case of unauthorised disclosure or alteration of individual health 
information.  Goldschmidt [2] states that electronic health records may pose new threats for 
compromising sensitive personal health data.  Moreover, Goldschmidt illustrates that 
malevolent motivations could disclose confidential personal health information on a more 
massive scale than possible with traditional paper-based medical records.  Carter [3] states 
that successful implementation of electronic record systems must learn from the UK’s 
previous health strategy experience.  In addition, Quinne7 discusses the fact that the largest 
threat to successful implementation of a national health information system is user adoption.  
User acceptability in e-health relies on the healthcare consumers’ willingness to overcome 
the fear of privacy invasion in relation to their health information. There is also the factor of 
the healthcare service providers’ willingness to adopt new technology that does not always 
facilitate working practices.  To convince healthcare service consumers and providers to use 
electronic health records, it is crucial to instil confidence that electronic health information is 
well protected and that privacy is assured.   
 
Adopting appropriate security technologies can help address some of the complexity 
associated with privacy concerns.  Moreover, security technologies such as computer and 
data network access control mechanisms and cryptography can ensure the security of 
electronic health records.  
 
It may be argued that the maintenance of suitable levels of security in electronic health 
systems can be effectively monitored and enforced by legislation and regulation.  Thus, an 
understanding of international/national legal requirements and standards regarding the 
maintenance of electronic health records could be seen as necessary for the establishment 
of any framework for appropriate security management in an HIS.   
 
3. An Overview of Privacy Laws and Legislations Related to Health Information 
Protection 
 
‘Privacy’ is concerned with the rights of an individual.  This is in contrast to the rights of 
society as a whole or the rights of an organisation or state.  In these broader applications we 
generally discuss confidentiality issues with the more generic terminology ‘security’.  
Ensuring individuals’ privacy is a major concern of an e-health management system.  To 
ensure citizens’ privacy is protected, governments legislate ‘privacy principles’.   
 
This section provides an overview of the current regulatory environments in the USA and 
Australia, including the Australian Federal Government, the States and Territories.  Section 
3.1 emphasises the key concepts of the USA’s HIPAA Security and Privacy Rules which 
contain security requirements relevant to implementation of the security controls in any HIS.  
Section 3.2 outlines the Australian Federal Privacy Act and relevant Australian 
State/Territory privacy laws and health record legislation.  
                                            
7
 Quinn, J., “Lessons from the UK EMR: Not Exactly Apples to Apples” is available at 
http://www.healthleaders.com/news/print.php?contentid=60316,  accessed 17/08/2005 
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3.1 USA Privacy Laws and Health-related Privacy Legislation 
 
3.1.1 HIPAA Overview 
HIPAA [4] was enacted in 1996 by the USA’s Congress.  The USA’s Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is mandated with the responsibility and 
authority to implement and enforce HIPAA.  HIPAA is a broad Federal statute that addresses 
numerous healthcare related topics.  Under “Subtitle F - Administrative Simplification of Title 
II of HIPAA” three types of entities, referred to as “covered entities”, are affected: healthcare 
providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.  The purpose of HIPAA provisions is 
to encourage electronic transactions and to require safeguards to protect the security and 
confidentiality of health information.   
 
HIPAA Administrative Simplification consists of four sub-sections: Privacy Rule, Security 
Rule, Electronic Transactions and Code Set, and Unique Identifier Rules.   
 
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) implements and enforces the Privacy Rule.  The Centre for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) undertakes administration and enforcement of all 
other Administrative Simplification activities including the Security Rules.  Covered entities 
are required to analyse the nature and resources of their businesses to determine 
reasonable and appropriate measures to ensure the security of “protected health information 
(PHI)” [5].  
 
3.1.2 Security Rule  
The primary goal of the Security Rule is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of “individually identifiable health information (IIHI)”, i.e. protected health information (PHI).  
The Security Rule is relevant to all “electronic protected health information (EPHI)” the 
covered entity creates, receives, maintains or transmits.  Most covered entities were to be in 
compliance with the Security Rule no later than 20 April 2005, with compliance for small 
health plans to be no later than 20 April 2006 [6].  The security standards defined in the 
Security Final Rule are intended to be technology-neutral. Covered entities have options in 
selecting the appropriate technology to protect EPHI, based on the nature and resources of 
their business [5].   
 
The implementation specifications of the Rule are separated into two types: “required” and 
“addressable”.  A covered entity can make implementation decisions on addressable 
implementation specifications but must meet the required implementation specifications.  
The Security Final Rule consists of three categories of security safeguards including: 
administrative, technical and physical safeguards.  In particular, the technical safeguards 
include the security technology and related policies and procedures that protect EPHI, 
including access control, audit, integrity, person or entity authentication and transmission 
security [5] .  
 
3.1.3 Privacy Rule  
The Privacy Final Rule protects all forms of PHI maintained or transmitted by a covered 
entity or its business associate.    There are no restrictions on the use or disclosure of de-
identified health information. The Privacy Final Rule grants individuals new rights which will 
permit them to access their health information and allow them to control how it is used.  
Generally, PHI can be used or disclosed by covered entities for the purposes of treatment, 
payment and healthcare operations.  The Privacy Final Rule requires covered entities to 
implement appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect PHI from 
any intentional or unintentional use or disclosure that violates the Rule [5]. 
  
The Privacy Rule defines situations or purposes on the permitted uses and disclosures of 
PHI. There are also civil, monetary and criminal penalties for failure to comply with the 
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Privacy Rule.   For most covered entities, compliance requirement with the Privacy Rule was 
required as of 14 April 2003, with compliance by small health plans to be by April 2004 [6] . 
 
The “Minimum Necessary” standard is a key provision in the Privacy Rule.  To prevent 
unnecessary or inappropriate access to and disclosure of PHI, a covered entity must make 
reasonable efforts to limit the use or disclosure of, and requests for, PHI to the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the intended purpose.  Covered entities must develop and 
implement minimum necessary policies and procedures that control access and uses of PHI 
based on the job functions and the nature of the business.  These minimum necessary 
policies and procedures must identify the persons or classes of persons within the workforce 
who need access to PHI, the categories of PHI needed, and circumstances appropriate to 
such access, to achieve necessary tasks [5].   
 
3.1.4 Security Rule and Privacy Rule – “No security, no privacy” 
Beaver and Herold [7] state that security is the strategy and privacy is the consequence.  
Security has long been recognised as having three major aspects, including confidentiality in 
addition to integrity and availability.  The requirements of the Privacy Final Rule may overlap 
with some requirements of the Security Final Rule.  For instance, the Privacy Final Rule 
requires covered entities to adopt appropriate administrative, physical and technical 
safeguards and to implement those safeguards reasonable for the protection of the privacy 
of a PHI.  Compliance with these requirements of the Privacy Final Rule will also satisfy the 
requirements of the Security Final Rule [5].   
 
While security and privacy are very closely related, they can involve distinct activities.  It is 
important to note major differences between the Privacy and Security Final Rules.  The 
Security Final Rule covers PHI in electronic form only; nevertheless, the Privacy Rule 
applies to all forms of PHI including oral, written or electronic form.  The Security Rule 
defines administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of EPHI.  The Privacy Final Rule, by contrast, asserts that a 
covered entity must implement appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards 
to protect the privacy of PHI from intentional or unintentional use or disclosure that is in 
violation of the standards.  Additionally, the Privacy Final Rule defines the criteria on the use 
or disclosure of PHI and individuals are granted new rights to access their health information 
[5].    
 
3.1.5 HIPAA Implications   
HIPAA will have a tremendous impact on existing technology, as well as requiring the 
consideration of new technology to effectively support a comprehensive, compliant strategy.  
ICT products and systems enable an effective safeguard strategy to assist the healthcare 
industry to comply with HIPAA requirements.  HIPAA covered entities need to clearly identify 
the specific standards and implementation specifications that map their policies and 
procedures to conform to HIPAA requirements.     
  
HIPAA prescribes no particular software or technology to protect PHI.  The HIPAA Security 
Final Rule generalises the access control standards from the previous proposed regulations.  
No specific access control mechanisms are identified.  Any appropriate access control 
method is allowed.  It is worthwhile to note that there are several definitions in the proposed 
regulations that are removed from the definitions in the Final Rule, such as role-based 
access control and usage-based access control.  It has been apparently considered too 
restrictive to just include specific kinds of access control mechanisms.  There are a variety of 
access control methods available, such as mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary 
access control (DAC), time-of-day parameters, object classification, subject-object 
separation and partitioned rule-based access control.     
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There are numerous security enhancing techniques available, such as digital signature or 
checksum technologies, that ensures that the integrity of EPHI in covered entities’ 
possession is maintained and that records have not been altered or destroyed in an 
unauthorised manner.  Likewise, there are a number of techniques that can be used to 
authenticate users, such as biometric identification, password systems, personal 
identification numbers (PIN) and even well-understood telephone callback8 systems.   
 
Use of encryption technology for transmitting EPHI is an addressable implementation 
specification.   The Security Final Rule does not specify any encryption strength, since 
technology evolves so rapidly.  Network technologies such as Virtual Private Networks 
(VPN9), Network Layer Security (IPSec10) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL11)/Transport 
Layer Security (TLS12) may be used as possible solutions to address the transmission 
security of EPHI.  In any event, the Security Rule allows covered entities to adopt 
reasonable and appropriate technical safeguards to protect EPHI based on their 
circumstances [8].   
 
3.2 Australian Privacy Laws and Health-related Privacy Legislation 
 
Australian privacy legislation encompasses several statutes including Federal, State and 
Territory laws.   
 
3.2.1 Australian Federal Government 
The principal Federal statute is the Privacy Act 1988 [9] which has provisions for the 
protection of the privacy of personal information including eleven “Information Privacy 
Principles (IPPs)”.  The Commonwealth and ACT government agencies are subject to these 
eleven IPPs.  They address how federal and ACT government agencies should collect, use 
and disclose as well as provide access to personal information including the ability to grant 
individuals certain rights to access their personal information and correct errors [10].   
 
The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 was enacted to extend the application of 
the Privacy Act 1988 to cover the protection of personal information held by private sector 
organisations throughout Australia.  These amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 
(Commonwealth) contain ten “National Privacy Principles (NPPs)”.  The NPPs apply to large 
private sector organisations with an annual turnover of more than $3 million (Aust) and all 
health service providers in the private sector.   The NPPs stipulate how private sector 
organisations should collect, use and disclose, keep secure, and provide access to personal 
information [11]. 
 
Undue emphasis on and control of confidentiality, however, could make access to personal 
health data difficult for medical studies, which could put the integrity of medical research at 
risk.  Guidelines s.95 [12] and s.95A [13] balance the protection of the confidentiality of 
individual health information with the need for ethically approved research using such  
individual health data without consent from the individual(s) involved.  The Guidelines 
                                            
8
 A security feature used to authenticate users calling in to a network.  During callback, the system authenticates the caller’s 
identity, hangs up, and then returns the call, either to a number requested during the initial call or to a predetermined number. 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/visio/visio2002/plan/glossary.mspx  accessed 22/11/2005. 
9
 A VPN is a network scheme connected via Internet, but information sent across the Internet with encryption and other security 
mechanisms to ensure that only authorised users can access the network and the transmitted data cannot be intercepted by 
unauthorised party.  http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/V/VPN.html  accessed 22/11/2005. 
10
 IPSec is a security mechanism for ensuring secure communications over open networks through the use of cryptographic 
security services.  IPSec supports network-level peer authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality 
http://www.microsft.com/windowsserver2003/technologies/networking/ipsec/default.mspx accessed 22/11/2005. 
11
 SSL, designed by Netscape, is a commonly used protocol for endpoint authentication and communications privacy using 
cryptography on the Internet.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Sockets_Layer accessed 18/06/2006.  
12
 TLS, designed by IETF, is a non-proprietary protocol.  It is derived from SSL and has almost identical to SSLv3 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security accessed 18/06/2006.  
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provide guidance for the conduct of research relevant to public health or public safety and for 
human research ethics committees to follow when considering proposals.  Guideline s95 
applies to medical research that involves access to personal information held by 
Commonwealth agencies where identified information needs to be used without consent 
from the individual(s) involved.  Guideline s95A applies to medical research that involves 
access to personal information held by organisation in the private sector.   
 
3.2.2 Commonwealth/Federal – State and Territory Privacy Acts 
Table 1 indicates the general structure of the privacy legislation in Australia. 
 
Table 1 General structure of privacy legislation in Australia 
Jurisdi
ction 
Law-Regulation-Code-Standard Covered Entity 
Effective 
Date 
Relevant Guidelines 
Privacy Act 1988  
Commonwealth and ACT 
government agencies 
1988 
Guidelines to the Information Privacy 
Principles  
http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/guidelines/in
dex.html  
Cth 
The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 
2000 
Some private sector 
organisations 
21-12-2001 
Guidelines to the National Privacy 
Principles 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npp
gl_01.html 
Australian Capital Territory Government Service 
(Consequential Provisions) ACT 1994 
Public sector 
 
 
  
ACT 
The Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 
1997 
Public and private sectors 01-02- 1998  
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
1988  (PPIP) 
Public sector agencies    
NSW 
Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
(HRIP) 
Public and private sectors 01-09-2004 
4 statutory guidelines under the HRIP Act. 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/priva
cynsw/ll_pnsw.nsf/pages/PNSW_03_hripa
ct#4b  
Victorian Information Privacy Act 2000 Public sector 01-09-2002   
Health Records Act 2001 Public and private sectors 07-01-2002  VIC 
Health Records Regulations 2002 Public and private sectors 07-01-2002  
No privacy laws  
Information Standard No 42 - Information Privacy 
(IS42) 
Public sector Sep-2001 
IS42 Information Privacy Guidelines 
http://www.governmentict.qld.gov.au/02_inf
ostand/downloads/is42guidelines.pdf 
QLD 
IS Information Privacy for the 
Queensland  Department of Health (IS42A)  
Queensland Health  Sep-2001 
IS42A Information Privacy Guidelines 
http://www.governmentict.qld.gov.au/02_inf
ostand/downloads/is42aguidelines.pdf 
No privacy laws  
Cabinet Administrative Instruction 1/89 
Public sector 
 
Jul-1992  
SA 
Code of Fair Information Practice 
Public sector, including the 
Department of Health and/or 
funded service providers 
Jul-2004  
WA 
No privacy laws. 
a public discussion paper released on 20 May 
2003 
    
TAS The Personal Information and Protection Act 2004 
Public sector including the 
University of Tasmania 
5-09-2005  
Northern Territory of Australia Information Act 
2002 
Public sector 1-07-2003  
Northern Territory of Australia Information 
Regulations   
Public sector 1-07-2003  NT 
No specific health information protection laws.      
Privacy Act 1988  
Commonwealth and ACT 
government agencies 
1988 
Guidelines to the Information Privacy 
Principles  
http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/guidelines/in
dex.html  
ACT 
The Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 
1997  
Public and private sectors 1-02-1998  
 
3.2.3 The Need for a Nationally Consistent Health Regime 
To date, Australia has not established a nationally consistent approach to handle health 
information legislation, like the USA’s HIPAA.  The National Health and Medical Research 
Council13 (NHMRC) describes health information as a particular subset of personal 
information, so that health privacy is set within the general privacy framework.  The relevant 
privacy legislation in Australia includes the Commonwealth Privacy Act . As indicated in 
Table 1, some States and Territories have their own privacy legislation, health record Acts, 
information standards, codes of conduct, guidelines and the use of common law for the 
protection of health information.  In fact, the Commonwealth, Victoria, NSW, ACT, Tasmania 
and the Northern Territory have various forms of privacy legislation.  There are no 
specifically independent laws to address the privacy of health information in QLD, SA and 
                                            
13 ”Health Privacy Framework” is available at http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/ethics/human/issues/privacy.htm#1, accessed 
20/06/2006. 
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WA, but these states have administrative standards and obligations.  Fernando [14] raises 
the concern that the problems of overlap in federal, state and territory privacy laws create 
complexity and confusion in the health privacy legislative environment.  It is a challenge to 
develop HISs that are compliant with a complex patchwork of health privacy laws.  This 
could also impose upon an organisation high costs or impediments in attempting to conform 
to either the relevant jurisdictional or federal privacy laws.  Undoubtedly, the need for 
establishing a nationally consistent privacy regime to adequately protect the security of 
health information is paramount.  
 
Recently, the Australian Government developed a draft for a National Health Privacy Code 
[15].  There are eleven National Health Privacy Principles (NHPPs) within the Code.  The 
goals of the Code are to protect health privacy and to achieve national consistency in health 
privacy protection across jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors.  The 
proposed Code considers the way individual health information is managed as a result of 
technological change.  The Code also contains some new components intended to facilitate 
the secure exchange of health information between jurisdictions and across electronic health 
information networks.   
 
4. Security Evaluation for Health Information Systems  
 
In order to realise success with any ICT system design where security features are important 
it is essential to be able to demonstrate that the system achieves its stated security 
objectives.  This can be realised through the application of a Security Evaluation Scheme.  In 
e-health initiatives, special safeguards need to be established to ensure that the information 
collected, disclosed and shared through any HIS is kept confidential and is protected from 
misuse and unauthorised access, accidental or deliberate, from both internal and external 
sources.  Given the increased sophistication of ICT technology, there is an acknowledged 
need for international standards to be used to evaluate the security level of any HIS.      
 
4.1 ICT Security Evaluation Schemes    
Over the last 25 years, there have been a number of internationally recognised and 
accepted evaluation schemes that may be used to assess the strength of security 
architecture and implementation in ICT products and systems in general, including health-
related systems.  Some of these are the USA’s Trusted Computer Security Evaluation 
Criteria (TCSEC) [16] (often cited as the “Orange Book” with associated documents known 
as the “Rainbow Series”), the European Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
(ITSEC) [17], and the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria14 (CTCPEC).    
 
These evaluation criteria, along with others, have been largely superseded by the 
internationally accepted “Common Criteria (CC)” for such evaluation [18].   The CC is an 
international standard for developing security specifications and performing security 
evaluations of resulting products and systems, with the main goal being to harmonise and 
align the earlier TCSEC, CTCPEC and ITSEC above, as well as other national initiatives in 
the area.  It was designed and developed through multinational efforts.   
 
The CC provides a common set of security requirements for IT products or systems under 
the distinct areas of functional requirements, and assurance/evaluation requirements.  The 
functional requirements define desired security behaviour.  Assurance or evaluation 
requirements are used as the bases for gaining confidence that the claimed security 
measures are effective, reliable and robust and are implemented correctly.   
 
4.2 Essential Concepts of the CC 
                                            
14
 CTCPEC is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CTCPEC, accessed 02/08/2006. 
59
                    Proceedings of the National e-Health Privacy and Security Symposium 2006 (ehPASS'06) -  ISBN: 1741071380 © 2006 QUT.

   
 
There are a number of basic concepts and terms in the CC that need to be defined. These 
are: 
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): the part of an ICT product, application or system being 
evaluated, including its documentation, that provides the functionality to counter the 
threats defined in its “Security Target”.   
• Security Target (ST): the security functionality and assurance measures required in a 
product or system along with the environment in which they are designed to work.  
• Protection Profiles (PP): a set of security functionality and assurance requirements, 
often with a specified EAL, for an ICT product or system that meets some particular 
need. It normally contains an outline of a set of relevant threats with security function 
requirements and assurance activities along with a justification of how these address 
the threats [19].  
Essentially a (TOE,ST) pair is assessed for compliance with a PP.  The assessment is 
performed with respect to CC evaluation levels. 
 
4.2.1 Evaluation Levels 
Evaluation is a check of processes employed. The evaluation assurance levels in the CC 
range from “EAL1”, the lowest, to “EAL7”, the highest. Each assurance level places 
increasing demands on the developer for evidence and testing [19].   
 
Evaluation performed up to the EAL4 level requires the examination of design documents, 
management procedures and allied factors in the creation of products, using non-challenging 
criteria. Evaluations from EAL5 to EAL7 require software code examination, for example, 
along with even more formal definition of security relevant structures by the security system 
architects and developers. In particular, EAL7, the highest rating, requires that key parts of 
the ICT product or system be rigorously verified in a mathematical way [20]. 
 
4.3 Protection Profiles  
A range of PPs is being developed addressing security needs for access control devices and 
systems, operating systems, databases, network boundary protection devices and systems, 
smart cards related devices and systems and other application needs.  In relation to the 
privacy of healthcare systems an examination of relevant operating system, access control 
related PPs is needed. This includes:,  
• Controlled Access PP,  
• Labelled Security PP, 
• Role Based Access Control PP, and 
• Healthcare systems related PPs. 
 
4.3.1 Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP)  
Firstly, the assurance level of the CAPP [21] is “EAL 3”, a rather low level. The CAPP adopts 
the earlier “Discretionary Access Control (DAC)” policy of the 19893 TCSEC to enforce 
access limitations on individual users and data objects.  DAC allows system users to decide 
on the type of access to be given to other users at the discretion of the owner of the 
information.  Such a policy does not provide capability to the actual owner of the system to 
define and enforce a fully centralised access control policy over an enterprise’s information 
resources.  CAPP compliant products should also provide an audit function to record any 
security relevant events that may occur within the system.  The CAPP is designed to protect 
assets in a “moderate” risk environment.  It is vital to note that under this protection profile 
the level of protection requirement is based on the assumption that products or systems 
operate in a non-hostile, benign and cooperative community. Such an environment clearly 
does not apply to computer systems connected to the global Internet whereby, for example, 
programs from sources outside the DAC environment may be introduced into the system    
 
4.3.2 Labelled Security Protection Profile (LSPP)  
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The assurance level of the LSPP [22] is “EAL 3 augmented”. LSPP conformant products 
should support two classes of access control mechanism, namely DAC, as above, and 
“Mandatory Access Control (MAC)”.  With the MAC policy, the overriding information access 
rule is based on a concept of “clearances” for users and “classification” for information 
defined by the owner of the information system and not by its users or developers.  Access 
permissions are determined by a user’s clearance compared with the sensitivity or 
classification level label on information stored in the system, not upon the user’s discretion. 
The LSPP is designed to protect assets in a moderate risk environment.  This protection 
profile provides for a level of protection under the assumption that products may not operate 
in the non-hostile and benign community.         
 
4.3.3 Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile (RBAC PP) 
The assurance level of the RBAC PP [23] is a very low “EAL 2”. The RBAC PP specifies 
security functionality and assurance requirements for general purpose operating systems, 
database management systems, systems management tools and other applications.  RBAC 
compliant TOEs should support user’s access rights based on such parameters as job 
function, enforcement of least privilege for administrators and users, enforcement of 
separation of duties, and hierarchical definitions of roles.  The objective of RBAC is to 
simplify and streamline the management of user authorisation to reduce the probability of 
mistakes and thereby strengthen assurance of a system’s overall security.    
 
4.3.4 Health Related Protection Profiles 
Indeed a PP for the privacy and security of both electronic health and medical records would 
be a valuable addition to the library of the protection profiles available under the “Common 
Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA)”.  Such a health protection profile initiative15 has 
been under development since 1999 but, unfortunately, no published protection profile for 
healthcare has eventuated.  However, in relation to appropriate sub-systems, PPs related to 
health “smart cards” have been published:  Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (PP 
eHC) [24], and Protection Profile for Health Professional Card (PP HPC) [25].  These PPs 
have set an evaluation level of “EAL4+”.  They specify sets of security features for eHC and 
electronic HPC respectively according to the regulations of the German healthcare system.  
They specify appropriate authentication parameters for cardholders along with levels of 
security for stored data, etc. 
 
4.4 Privacy Requirements and CC PPs 
The USA’s “HIPAA Final Rule” does not prescribe any particular access control mechanisms 
or any particular technology to protect PHI, apparently in order to embrace the principle of 
“technology neutrality”.  Any appropriate access control method can be used to protect PHI.  
In Australia, relevant privacy legislation, including jurisdictional health record laws, 
addresses the privacy requirements for the protection of personal information via a broad 
approach. An entity is required to implement reasonable steps to safeguard personal 
information it holds from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.    
 
In general, current regulatory requirements for privacy in healthcare systems do not 
restrictively impose the use of any specific computer software or allied technology for data 
protection since they are intended to be technology-neutral.  These requirements are also 
meant to provide minimum guidelines to healthcare providers.  It is easily argued that it is 
worthwhile for healthcare providers to consider providing a tailored product that better meets 
the needs of the healthcare industry than that specified as the minimum requirements set. 
From a business viewpoint a superior product has many advantages: desirability in the 
marketplace, long-term potential, continual enhancement opportunities, a relatively captive 
market, etc.  The technical processes and procedures which would enable a higher standard 
                                            
15
 NIST, “Health Care Protection Profile Initiative” is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1999/proceeding/papers/o19.pdf 
accessed 05/08/2006. 
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of healthcare product are available today.  It is entirely feasible to develop current 
technology into a practical workable solution for the healthcare industry at a standard 
exceeding the current minimum requirements.  The end-product would protect health 
records by providing stricter access control measures, thereby preventing unauthorised 
access. 
 
Our approach to addressing this issue is to develop Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
techniques to a sufficiently high, yet useable, standard that would enable an effective 
operational-level foundation on which to further the design and development of health 
applications.  Currently, the generic CAPP, by adopting a Discretionary Access Control 
(DAC) policy, allows “owners” of data (typically end users) to enable access to that data in a 
completely arbitrary manner.  Under DAC the “owner” of the system is dictated by its end 
users with respect to access to enterprise data.  DAC policies, therefore, encourage weak 
access control requirements that effectively provide inadequate protection against 
penetration by such “malware” as “viruses”, “trojans”, “spyware”, “rootkits” and other 
malicious program code.  As a consequence it may be readily asserted that a product or 
system only meeting CAPP requirements does not enable sufficient security protection for 
Internet and allied connected health-related systems. 
 
With MAC, the delegation of access permissions is taken out of the hands of system users 
and software developers.  In effect, MAC policy enables the system to define and enforce an 
overall, enterprise-defined set of data access and program activation rules.  Typically these 
rules are based upon the requirements of the system application and associated legal 
parameters and/or regulations. Thus, in the case of healthcare information systems such 
rules would be developed to satisfy health regulation requirements.  Appropriately, the CC’s 
LSPP embraces both the DAC and MAC policy rules and sets strict access limitation on both 
users and data objects.  In addition, a product or system meeting the LSPP provides better 
resistance to unauthorised access to the system.  
 
Another important concept, currently available through modern MAC systems, is Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC), defining an individual’s role in the organisation as a major 
parameter rather than just a user’s individual identity.  The driving force behind the RBAC 
policy is thus to simplify and make more flexible the management of authorisation.  
 
5. Protection and Enforcement Using Cryptography  
 
Cryptographic technologies have long been used for integrity and confidentiality purposes.   
(It is important to understand that the principle role of cryptography is to ensure the quality of 
service of the technology, and thus ensure that the technology satisfies the business 
requirements of the system.  Cryptography, then, is primarily an enabler of services; 
detection and prevention of security breaches is a subset of this primary function.) For 
integrity, a ”keyed hash function” may be applied to each relevant data record to prevent 
unauthorised insertion of records as well as unauthorised alteration of existing records. An 
unauthorised third party (or an authorised party extending beyond their authorisation) would 
need to possess the necessary key to either create or re-make the integrity enforcing 
checksum, commonly referred as a “message authentication code (MAC)”.  Confidentiality 
can be enforced using a single-key cipher, but key management structures to allow for 
multiple roles to have access to a healthcare record would be necessarily complex. As such, 
maintaining record confidentiality using public key cipher schemes may be advantageous.  
Historically with this approach, a performance penalty may have been involved, but with 
current hardware bases for the implementation of these ciphers, such performance problems 
are normally minimal.   
 
Encryption should be used, and normally is used, to protect data in transit for complete end-
to-end protection; where the term ‘end-to-end’ refers to the two end nodes themselves as 
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well as the communication link between them. Data in storage should also be encrypted for 
end-point security against unauthorised or accidental access or eavesdropping.     
 
For end-to-end security, UK NHS is undertaking the “Cryptography and the Pathology 
Messaging Enabling Project16” for the implementation of national standard pathology 
messaging.  For such a large-scale project, the NHS has adopted a “Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI)” scheme to provide transmission security for pathology messages 
through data encryption and digital signature technologies.  The New Zealand Health 
Information Service uses the “National Health Index17 (NHI)” numbering scheme to uniquely 
identify individuals for treatment and healthcare purposes.  Within the NHI numbering 
system, each individual record contains a unique NHI number associated with personal 
information.  The NHI numbering system is linked to a separate clinical information system, 
the “Medical Warnings System (MWS)”.  The MWS can only be accessed through the 
associated NHI number.  All NHI messages are protected by an encryption technique while 
they travel over the Health Intranet via VPN technology.  The encrypted form of the NHI 
number is used for clinical or analytic studies, rather than removing all personally identifiable 
information.  This would make data anonymous to protect the privacy of individuals.   
 
At the commercial level, RSA Security Inc. of the USA has launched a software system 
using database encryption, in conjunction with digital signatures, to protect patient 
information. However, encryption of “data at rest”, i.e. data contained in database systems 
on disk storage and on various “backup” storage media, still does not seem to be 
widespread and a literature analysis has failed to indicate any major trend in this area. 
 
6. Some Implications and Conclusions 
ICT is now sufficiently advanced that a MAC-based electronic healthcare management 
system is feasible.  This approach would overcome many of the privacy and confidentiality 
issues which have plagued previous attempts at electronic health management systems.  
The Mandatory Access Control operating system primarily satisfies the requirement for 
confidentiality of records, which has shown to been a major impediment to current and 
previous systems.  The healthcare management system is then developed atop the secure 
MAC-based operating system.   
 
This paper has reviewed current ICT security architectures and standards.  It is suggested 
that the healthcare community should adopt a policy of purchase and operation of overall 
information systems that are certified at a CC “EAL4” level, at least, when such information 
systems contain personal health data. The PP should be at least based around the LSPP 
definition enabling overall enterprise security and privacy rules to be defined and enforced.  
At the present, there appears to be no “EAL6” level, general purpose operating system 
commercially available “off-the-shelf” [26].  It could also be recommended that any 
application or sub-system responsible for the security enforcement activities for individually 
identifiable health information must be evaluated at least at a level of “EAL5”, and preferably 
higher. This would include, in particular, any appropriate cryptographic sub-systems for such 
usage. Commercial computer and network systems currently, or soon will, exist to meet 
these requirements.  Examples include:  
• “Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 4 Update 1 AS”,  
• “Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 4 Update 1 WS”, 
• “Trusted Solaris 8”, and others.  
 
Undoubtedly, health information is highly sensitive by its nature. Therefore, it is critical to 
protect such information from any security hazards and privacy threats.  It is argued that 
                                            
16
 “Cryptography and the Pathology Messaging Enabling Project” is available at 
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/pathology/security_and_encryption/crypto_v5/, accessed 15/08/2006. 
17
 “National Health Index” is available at http://www.nzhis.govt.nz/nhi/index.html, accessed 15/08/2006. 
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adoption of appropriate security technologies, including in particular MAC oriented operating 
system bases for such systems, can help demystify some of the complexity associated with 
the maintenance of confidentiality of healthcare records. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a general architecture for a modern healthcare information system, which 
consists of health application services, middleware, database management system, network 
control system, operating system and hardware. 
 
 
Security may be implemented at the level of the health services applications system.  
However, even if security is established within that health service system, the overall system 
can be no more secure than the operating system upon which the applications depend.  The 
operating system itself can be no more secure than the hardware facilities of the computer 
on which the operating system performs. Likewise, any other software component set, such 
as “middleware”, database management system (DBMS), network interface structure or 
“stack”, etc. is constructed above the operating system and so totally depend upon security 
functions provided by the operating system as well as the robustness of that OS against 
attack.   
 
Necessary healthcare security services such as authentication, authorisation, data privacy 
and data integrity can only be confidently assured when the operating system is trusted.  
Thus “trusted operating systems” provide the foundation for any security and privacy 
schemes required. Such strong security platforms may be considered as necessary to 
ensure the protection of electronic health information from both internal and external threats 
as well as providing conformance of health information systems to regulatory and legal 
requirements.   
 
Loscocco et al [27] have stated that the underlying operating system should be responsible 
for protecting the “application-space” against tampering, bypassing and spoofing attacks.  
They address the significance of secure operating systems as follows: 
“The threats posed by the modern computing environment cannot be addressed without support from 
secure operating systems and any security effort which ignores this fact can only result in a “fortress 
built upon sand.” 
It is an inherently insecure exercise to attempt to build an application requiring high levels of 
trust in the maintenance of security and privacy when the underlying structure within a 
computer system is a non-trusted operating system. Simply put, the trusted application relies 
totally upon the non-trusted operating system to access low level services.  
  
This analysis indicates that not only is a new level of security required in healthcare related 
information systems, based around MAC/LSPP structures but also that appropriate “chief 
information officers (CIOs)” and systems designers are educated, trained and experienced  
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in such systems. This would appear to present the major challenge to privacy and security in 
e-health information systems for at least the next 5 years.  
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